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From
Abduction, Reason and Science,
2001 p. 15
"Philosophers of science in the twentieth century have traditionally
distinguished between the logic of discovery and the logic of justification.
Most have concluded that no logic of discovery exists and, moreover, that a
rational model of discovery is impossible. In short, scientific discovery is
irrational and there is no reasoning to hypotheses. A new abstraction paradigm
aimed at unifying the different perspectives and providing some design insights
for future ones is proposed here: the aim of my research is to emphasize the
significance of abduction in order to illustrate the problem-solving process
and to propose a unified epistemological model of scientific discovery,
diagnostic reasoning, and other various kinds of creative reasoning".
From
Philosophy and Geometry, 2001,
preface of the author:
"In A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, Proclus says that
geometry “At the upper and most intellectual height [...] shows us what figures
are appropriate to the gods, which ones belong to primary beings and which ones
to the substance of souls”. In a passage of the Critique of Pure Reason devoted
to the philosophical traits of “mathematical knowledge”, Kant shows that
geometry and mathematics present “the most splendid example of the successful
extension of pure reason, without the help of experience”.
Since ancient times many philosophers have studied geometry. Geometrical
knowledge has often played the role of a laboratory for the philosopher’s
conceptual experiments dedicated to the ideation of powerful theories of
knowledge. This book addresses some of the main aspects of geometrical
knowledge, connecting it to the central epistemological question of scientific
rationality and to the problem of diagrammatic inferences and reasoning, where
geometry exhibits its most appealing logical and cognitive virtues."
From Morality in a Technological World,
2007 foreword:
"As the subtitle of Knowledge as a Duty suggests, morality is distributed in
our technological world in a way that makes some scientific problems
particularly relevant to ethics: ecological imbalances, the medicalization of
life, and advances in biotechnology – themselves all products of knowledge –
seem to me to be especially pertinent topics of discussion. The system of
designating certain animals as endangered, for example, teaches us that there
is a continuous delegation of moral values to externalities; it may also cause
some people to complain that wildlife receives greater moral and legal
protection than, for example, disappearing cultural traditions. I wondered what
reasoning process would result in a non-human thing’s being valued over a
living, breathing person and asked myself what might be done to elevate the
status of human beings. One solution, I believe, is to re-examine the respect
we have developed for particular externalities and then use those things as a
vehicle to return value to people.
The well-known Kantian tradition in ethics teaches that human beings should not
be treated solely as “means” or “things” in a merely instrumental way but
should, instead, be regarded as “ends.” I believe, however, that if we rigidly
adhere to Kant’s directive, then we make it impossible to embrace an important
new strategy I propose in chapter one: “respecting people as things,” the
notion that people must be regarded as “means” (things) insofar these means
involve “ends.” In essence, the idea holds that human beings often can and even
should be treated as “things,” and that in the process they become “respected
as things” that had been ascribed more value than some people. We must
reappropriate the instrumental and moral values that people have lavished on
external things and objects, which I contend is central to reconfiguring human
dignity in our technological world."
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