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From Abduction, Reason and Science, 2001 p. 15
"Philosophers of science in the twentieth century have traditionally  distinguished between the logic of discovery and the logic of  justification. Most have concluded that no logic of discovery exists  and, moreover, that a rational model of discovery is impossible. In  short, scientific discovery is irrational and there is no reasoning to  hypotheses. A new abstraction paradigm aimed at unifying the different  perspectives and providing some design insights for future ones is  proposed here: the aim of my research is to emphasize the significance  of abduction in order to illustrate the problem-solving process and to  propose a unified epistemological model of scientific discovery,  diagnostic reasoning, and other various kinds of creative reasoning".

From Philosophy and Geometry, 2001, preface of the author:
"In A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, Proclus says  that geometry “At the upper and most intellectual height [...] shows us  what figures are appropriate to the gods, which ones belong to primary  beings and which ones to the substance of souls”. In a passage of the  Critique of Pure Reason devoted to the philosophical traits of  “mathematical knowledge”, Kant shows that geometry and mathematics  present “the most splendid example of the successful extension of pure  reason, without the help of experience”.
Since ancient times many philosophers have studied geometry. Geometrical  knowledge has often played the role of a laboratory for the  philosopher’s conceptual experiments dedicated to the ideation of  powerful theories of knowledge. This book addresses some of the main  aspects of geometrical knowledge, connecting it to the central  epistemological question of scientific rationality and to the problem of  diagrammatic inferences and reasoning, where geometry exhibits its most  appealing logical and cognitive virtues."

From Morality in a Technological World,
2007 foreword:

"As the subtitle of Knowledge as a Duty suggests, morality is  distributed in our technological world in a way that makes some  scientific problems particularly relevant to ethics: ecological  imbalances, the medicalization of life, and advances in biotechnology –  themselves all products of knowledge – seem to me to be especially  pertinent topics of discussion. The system of designating certain  animals as endangered, for example, teaches us that there is a  continuous delegation of moral values to externalities; it may also  cause some people to complain that wildlife receives greater moral and  legal protection than, for example, disappearing cultural traditions. I  wondered what reasoning process would result in a non-human thing’s  being valued over a living, breathing person and asked myself what might  be done to elevate the status of human beings. One solution, I believe,  is to re-examine the respect we have developed for particular  externalities and then use those things as a vehicle to return value to  people.
The well-known Kantian tradition in ethics teaches that human beings  should not be treated solely as “means” or “things” in a merely  instrumental way but should, instead, be regarded as “ends.” I believe,  however, that if we rigidly adhere to Kant’s directive, then we make it  impossible to embrace an important new strategy I propose in chapter  one: “respecting people as things,” the notion that people must be  regarded as “means” (things) insofar these means involve “ends.” In  essence, the idea holds that human beings often can and even should be  treated as “things,” and that in the process they become “respected as  things” that had been ascribed more value than some people.  We must  reappropriate the instrumental and moral values that people have  lavished on external things and objects, which I contend is central to  reconfiguring human dignity in our technological world."


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